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1.  INTRODUCTION 
There are two competing views of the interaction between monetary and fiscal 
policy and their effects on price stability for policy-maker’s point of view. In the classical 
view, in Ricardian regimes it is the demand for liquidity and its evolution over time that 
determines prices. In such a regime fiscal policy is passive, which implies that 
government bonds are not net wealth [Barro (1974)], and monetary policy works through 
the interest rate or another instrument to determine prices. In the opposite view which is 
more recent, a non-Ricardian regime will prevail whenever fiscal policy becomes active1 
and does not accommodate or adjust primary surpluses to guarantee fiscal solvency. As a 
result, the Ricardian equivalence do not hold, and the increase in nominal public debt to 
finance persistent budget deficits is perceived by private agents as an increase in nominal 
wealth. In fiscal dominant regime the government’s fiscal policy becomes sustainable 
through debt deflation that is an increase in prices that wash away the real value of public 
debt and in turn the real value of financial wealth until demand equals supply and a new 
equilibrium is reached. In this regime prices are determined by fiscal policy, and inflation 
becomes a fiscal phenomenon. If, on the other hand, primary surpluses follow an 
arbitrary process, then the equilibrium path of prices is determined by the requirement 
known as fiscal solvency; that is, the price level has to jump to satisfy a present value 
budget constraint called non-Ricardian regime. The basic distinction between the two 
regimes is that in non-Ricardian regime fiscal policy plays the role where as in Ricardian 
regime monetary policy provides stability in prices. In FTPL, the results of fiscal and 
monetary policies depend on which policy has dominant characteristics. The 
consequences of policies differ depending on the active and passive characteristics of the 
policy and depending on the characteristics of the following policy. If the policy mix is 
such that monetary policy is active and fiscal policy is passive, fiscal policy 
accommodates monetary policies; these policies are called dominant monetary policy by 
Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Ricardian regime by Woodford (1994, 1995). In contrast  
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when the policy combination is passive monetary policy and active fiscal policy, 
monetary policy accommodates fiscal policy by considering budget deficits as a 
constraint in the political decision process. This policy combination is defined by Sargen 
and Wallace as dominant fiscal policy and Woodford call it non-Ricardian policy. 
In Pakistan like many developing economies monetary policy is under the pressure 
of budget deficit and fiscal policy shocks that may play role in the determination of prices 
[Woodford (1994) and Sims (1994)]. In this situation Ricardian policies lose their 
validity that can be seen commonly in developing markets2 as well as most periods in 
developed economies3. Therefore, an anti-inflation policy followed independently by the 
central bank could result in deflationary or inflationary spirals depending on the active 
and passive characteristics of fiscal policies [Loyo (2000)].4 In economies with fiscal 
dominant regimes, where domestic debt is subject to indexation and speculation, active 
anti-inflationary monetary policies result in hyperinflation [Favero-Giavazzi (2002)]. In 
such cases Leeper (1991) favors discretionary policy. Benhabib, et al. (1999, 2001) 
propose interest rate rule under fiscal dominant regime and find that Taylor rules are 
destabilising and price stability can only be achieved by an active monetary policy with 
passive backing by fiscal polices. Woodford (2000) views that collective movement of 
inflation, nominal interest rates and primary surpluses also hold in Ricardian and non-
Ricardian regime.  
Price stability is an important goal of monetary policy in Pakistan. The present 
study attempts to uncover empirical evidence on the relative importance of fiscal policy 
and monetary policy for price stability in Pakistan. This seems interesting because firstly, 
data indicate that public debt and fiscal imbalances are on the rise5 causing concerns 
about fiscal sustainability. This suggests that some form of fiscal dominance become an 
issue for Pakistan, Therefore considering the relevance of the issue in recent economic 
scenario, it is important to study the application of fiscal theory of price level to 
Pakistan’s economy. Secondly, so far, no systematic empirical work to discriminate 
between these two regimes monetary dominant and fiscal dominant, has been conducted. 
The only literature available [Hussain (1982); Massood and Ahmad (1980); and Saqib 
and Yasmin (1987)] investigates the relative importance of fiscal and monetary policy on 
aggregate economic activity.  In fact, there is need to probe this issue in detail and look 
for evidence on fiscal dominance in Pakistan by estimating simple and parsimonious 
model such as autoregressive system proposed by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001).  
2For Brazil the study by Loyo (2000) and Tanner and Ramos (2002) find evidence consistent with the 
fiscal theory of the price level. Baldirici and Erisin (2006) finds that fiscal dominance in Turkey increase after 
1980s as a result of increasing cost of capital. 
3Cochrane (1998) argues that the US data from 1960 are consistent with the fiscal theory of the price 
level determination. Also Sala (2003) finds that the fiscal theory of the price level characterises at least one 
phase of the post-war US history, specifically the period 1960–79. Favero and Monacelli (2003) also find some 
evidence of fiscal dominance in the United States for limited periods of time 1960–87. 
4He argues that Brazilian economy is subject to fiscal or non-Ricardian policies combined by active 
monetary policy rules resulting in hyperinflations in late 1980s. 
5In fact, public debt in has grown quite sharply over the years, 35.7 percent of GDP in 1960 to 61.3 
percent in 1970s and this percent has remained the same about 61.7 percent in 1980s. The public debt went up 
at an unprecedented rate during 1990s and on average it was 77.6 percent of GDP. The public debt has shown 
an increasing trend in 2000s however as a percentage of GDP it shows a decrease which is average 66.4 percent 
of GDP (Economic Survey). 
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Thirdly, the principles of fiscal theory of price level require that it is necessary to have 
appropriate fiscal policy and also an adequate monetary policy to achieve price stability. 
Unless specific measures are taken to ensure an appropriate fiscal policy, the objective of 
price stability may not be achieved despite the independence of State Bank of Pakistan 
and its commitment to low inflation. This motivates to assess the empirical plausibility of 
both fiscal and monetary dominant regimes in case of Pakistan’s economy. The present 
study distinguishes between these two regimes with Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
approach following Canzoneri, et al. (2001).  There exists long run relationship between 
primary surplus and public liabilities which implies that these two series cannot move 
away from each other [Trehan and Ramos (2002)]. This suggests that time-series 
techniques are useful in providing testing procedures for application of fiscal theory of 
price level.  
The plan of rest of study is as follows: Section 2 reviews briefly the empirical 
literature on the relative importance of fiscal and monetary policy for price stability. The 
empirical methodology to differentiate between monetary and fiscal dominance and data 
are discussed in Section 3. The empirical results are provided in Section 4 and the last 
section offers conclusion.  
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The interaction between monetary and fiscal policy is well researched area for 
developed countries where the dimensions of investigation includes the issues related to 
the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy [Alesina and Tabellini (1987); Debelle and 
Fischer (1994); Dixit and Lambertini (2001) and Buti, et al. (2002)]; on optimal 
monetary and fiscal policy [Lucas Stokey (1983); Chari, et al. (1991); Benigno and 
Woodford (2003); Beetsma and Jensen (2002); Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and 
Correia, et al. (2003)] and the channels through which fiscal actions affect monetary 
variables and focuses on the constraints imposed by fiscal policy on the monetary 
authority [Calvo and Guidotti (1992, 1993) and Fair (1994)]. 
Sargent and Wallace (1981) influential study is the first attempt to show how the 
government intertemporal budget constraint may affect monetary policy conditions and, in 
particular, price dynamics After this study a number of papers have tried to assess from an 
empirical perspective how monetary and fiscal policies interact and, explicitly or implicitly, 
have looked for evidence of fiscal dominance. Melitz (1997, 2002) jointly estimate the 
reaction functions of the monetary and fiscal authorities on a pool of nineteen OECD 
countries over the period 1960–95 and finds that monetary and fiscal policy have tended to 
move in opposite directions. Favero (2002) concludes that stabilisation of inflation has been 
achieved independently in Europe from the lack of fiscal discipline, supporting the idea that 
the monetary authorities in Europe have been able to affect inflation rates. A study by Favero 
and Monacelli (2003) also finds some evidence of fiscal dominance in the United States for 
limited periods of time 1960–87. They conclude that it is possible to identify time windows 
where an empirical model based on both monetary and fiscal regime is able to track the 
dynamics of inflation better than a regime based on a monetary rule only. Blanchard (2004) 
and Favero and Giavazzi (2004) argue that when the public debt is large, an increase in 
interest rates aimed at keeping inflation within the target raises the cost of debt service, the 
debt level, the default probability and the country premium, triggering capital outflows and 
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leading to a depreciation of the exchange rate, that affects inflation expectations and, 
eventually, inflation itself.  
The fiscal theory of the price level identifies another channel through which the 
central bank can lose control of inflation, even in the case of an independent monetary 
authority that need not accept seignorage targets dictated by the fiscal authority. 
Cochrane (1998, 1999), Auernheimer and Contreras (1990), Leeper (1991), Woodford 
(1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000), Sims (1994, 1995, 1997, 1998), Canzoneri and Diba 
(1998), Canzoneri, et al. (1997a,b, 2001, 2002), Dupor (1997), Bergin (2000), Christiano 
and Fitzgerald (2000), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000) and Benhabib, et al. (2001) are 
some studies done on this issue. This theory has found mixed empirical support. 
Canzoneri, et al. (2001) for example conclude that post-war US data are more consistent 
with a regime where monetary policy, and not fiscal policy, determines the price level. 
On the other hand, Cochrane (1998) argues that the US data from 1960 are consistent 
with the fiscal theory of the price level determination. Sala (2003) finds that the fiscal 
theory of the price level characterises at least one phase of the post-war US history, 
specifically the period 1960–79. Afonso (2002) finds that the fiscal theory of the price 
level does not support in case of fifteen European economies.  
Very few empirical work is conducted on emerging economies includes Tanner 
and Ramos (2002), who evaluate the policy regime in Brazil during the 1990s can better 
characterised as fiscal dominant, and IMF (2003), estimating a separate fiscal policy 
reaction function for a group of developed economies and a set of emerging markets finds 
that primary surpluses respond much more strongly to public debt in the developed 
countries. For Brazil the study by Loyo (2000) find evidence consistent with the fiscal 
theory of the price level where a tight monetary policy along with lose fiscal policy 
resulted in hyperinflation even without seinorage increase. Baldini and Ribineiro (2008) 
find in case of Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1980-2005 a mixed finding as some 
countries are dominated by fiscal regime, some by monetary regime and some have no 
clear result. Tufail (2008) shows that the fiscal policy in Pakistan is weakly sustainable 
for the period 1960 to 2006. There exists a long run relationship between government 
revenues and expenditures however; revenues are adjusting more than expenditures to 
keep the fiscal policy on the trajectory towards sustainability. The results of these studies 
seem to suggest that fiscal dominance might be an issue for emerging economies more 
than for developed ones. This motivates to test the fiscal dominance in case of Pakistan.  
3.  METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA 
To analyse the applicability of FTPL theory in accordance with the Ricardian 
equivalence theorem the methodology suggested by Canzoneri, et al. (2001), and Tanner 
and Ramos (2002) is adopted using the Pakistani data. The systematic relationship 
between public liabilities to GDP (wi) and surplus to GDP (si) is estimated by an 
unrestricted Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) model to assess whether primary 
balances are set exogenous or dependent on public liabilities. The advantage of this 
methodology is that it only requires the estimation of a relatively small number of 
parameters and it does not impose any restrictions on the economy. The VAR models are 
characterise with no a priori distinction between endogenous and exogenous variables 
and forecast performance is better than the one obtained by simultaneous equation model. 
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Canzoneri, et al. (2001) describe the relationship between liabilities to GDP wi and 
surplus to GDP ratio si is for period i as follows:  
1iiii wsw … … … … … … … (1) 
The Equation (1) states that the ratio of the total government liabilities to GDP has 
to be equal to the primary surpluses (including central bank transfers) to GDP ratio plus 
the discounted value of next period liabilities to GDP ratio. The discount factor is the 
ratio of real growth in GDP to the real interest rate. In the equation wi is liabilities to GDP 
ratio, si is surplus to GDP ratio t is discount factor. Woodford (1995) iterating Equation 
(1) one period ahead from the current period t and taking expectations conditional on 
information available in period t, the relationship becomes: 
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The fiscal theory of price determination treats Equation (2) as equilibrium 
condition that must be satisfied. The Hamilton and Flavin (1986) procedure is adopted to 
empirically test Equation (2) and they test as a government solvency condition. In this 
case, if primary surpluses are determined by an arbitrary process unrelated to primary 
debt, then nominal income and/or discount factor must jump in equilibrium to satisfy (2), 
called non-Ricardian or fiscal dominant regime. If on the other hand, primary surpluses 
are determined in such a way (2) is always satisfied no matter what nominal income and 
discount factor are determined elsewhere in the model, called the Ricardian or monetary 
dominant regime. Canzoneri, et al. (2001) suggest the following fiscal policy rule lead to 
Ricardian regime, let the sequence st is expected to follow the rule: 
iiii wcs
  
… … … … … … … (3) 
Where cj is time varying response parameter i is random variable which represents political 
factors and/or economic conditions. The fiscal rule (3) implies that the relationship (1) for 
any arbitrary value of wj and fiscal rule (3) results in Ricardian regime.  
For empirical analysis primary surpluses si is affected by past and current values of 
other variable wj; in the same way public liabilities are effected by current and past values 
of si, therefore the relationship is explained by the system given below: 
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First, considering the temporal relationship running from current liabilities to 
future primary surpluses, a monetary dominant regime is ruled out if future primary 
surpluses respond negatively to increases in current liabilities, or if there is no 
relationship between the two variables, indicating that primary surpluses are exogenous. 
A positive relationship between current primary surpluses innovations and future 
liabilities indicate that higher primary balances are created to compensate for positive 
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changes in liabilities in order to limit debt accumulation, which would be consistent with 
a monetary dominant regime. However, according to the fiscal theory of the price level, 
such positive relationship could arise also under a fiscal dominant regime, in which the 
price level falls, and the real value of liabilities increases, in anticipation of future higher 
primary surpluses. Next consider the temporal relationship running from current primary 
surplus to future liabilities. Under a monetary dominant regime, current innovations to 
primary surpluses should be negatively related to future government liabilities, because 
rises in the primary surpluses would be used to pay the debt. On the other hand, under 
monetary dominant regime, there would be no relationship between shocks to current 
primary surplus and future government liabilities.  
To discriminate between monetary dominant and fiscal dominant regime the VAR 
model is estimated over primary surpluses and liabilities. To account for possible lags in 
the variable response, impulse responses functions are used to trace the effect over time 
of current innovations in the primary surplus on future liabilities and of current 
innovations in liabilities on future primary surplus. According to Ricardian equivalence 
changes in government budget and public liabilities do not have effect on aggregate 
demand. The reverse is the case with non-Ricardian regime where the aggregate demand 
variation resulting from fiscal shocks cause variation in the real level of economic 
activity and in the interest rate and inflation rate. To examine the behavior of nominal 
GDP to the innovation in surplus VAR is estimated with order (ln (liabilities), surpluses 
and Ln(GDP)). In the next stage the model is extended by adding discount rate and VAR 
is estimate surpluses to GDP, liabilities to GDP and discount factor to make sure that the 
impulse responses on the original model survive after controlling for the discount factor. 
According to FTPL the main source of change in the price level can be explained by 
the wealth effect of private consumption which increases the nominal debt growth 
[Woodford (1998)]. Therefore a positive shock in domestic debt makes household believe 
that they can afford more lifetime consumption and leads to more demand for goods which 
drive up the prices. To assess which of the two policy variables: money growth or nominal 
debt growth can best explains inflation variability in Pakistan, after controlling for the 
aggregate demand measured by real output gap. To test for the existence of these wealth 
effects, a VAR is estimated with the following order (nominal debt growth, growth rate of 
reserve money, real output gap and inflation rate). Then the variance error decompositions 
for inflation are computed. These decompositions separate the variation in inflation into 
component shocks to the VAR, thus providing information about the relative importance of 
each random innovation in affecting inflation. If the forecast error is explained by shocks to 
nominal debt growth, it is argued that changes in the price level could be explained by the 
wealth effects of nominal debt growth, which would support the fiscal theory of price level. 
If instead the forecast error is explained by shocks to money growth, it is argued that 
monetary policy is passive and has accommodated shocks in debt through debt 
monetisation, ultimately causing inflation. The quantity theory of money says that this 
inflation channel would be associated with a fiscal dominant regime.6   
6The fact is that the increase in domestic debt could also be caused by an abrupt fall in output due to a shock 
exogenous to the economy (nationalisation of industries during seventies) or, endogenously, by (political instability and 
2005 earthquake). These types of shocks would cause imbalances in the supply and demand for goods, and in turn lead 
to lower taxation, thereby increasing the need to finance the government deficits by increasing domestic debt. 
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Data 
The data series for this study are extracted from International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) CD-ROM.(2008) issued by International Monetary Fund, Pakistan Statistical Year 
Book 2008, Pakistan Economic Survey (various issues). The data set includes 
government expenditure, government revenues, consumer price index, reserve money, 
discount rate, and gross domestic product for the period 1971-2007. All data series are 
converted in to year 2000 rupees. Primary surplus is difference in overall public revenues 
and public expenditures (deducing the interest payments) all divided by nominal GDP. 
Public liabilities are defined as debt plus money base divided by nominal GDP. The real 
output gap is measured as deviation of actual GDP from potential GDP, where potential 
GDP is the fitted values of the quadratic trend on GDP series. 
   
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
For estimation, first step is to test the stationarity of each variable.  The 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test is applied on primary surpluses, public 
liabilities, debt, inflation, reserve money, seigniorage and output gap including a constant 
and a trend. The ADF test results show the acceptance of the unit root in all series, that is, 
all the series are non-stationary at level, which is indicative of I(1) process, therefore all 
the variables are taken in first difference for further analysis. 
The methodology of Canzoneri, et al. (2001) is applied based on unrestricted VAR 
analysis which allows to identify monetary or fiscal dominant regimes by estimating the 
impulse response functions and variance decomposition. This test is based on impulse-
responses analysis of future liabilities to GDP to a shock in surplus to GDP, conditional 
on the persistence of the surplus to GDP, estimated by its autocorrelation. A surplus to 
GDP with a positive autocorrelation up to 5 lags7 is considered positive and persistent; 
otherwise the surplus is considered negatively autocorrelated, indicating low persistence.8  
The two possible ordering of the surplus to GDP and liabilities to GDP are used in 
the model because the VAR methodology reveals possible inconsistency in the results 
due to the ordering adopted in the model. The order in which the surplus to GDP comes 
first allows for contemprenous effect to innovation on liabilities/GDP, which is consistent 
with non-Ricardian or FD regime (where the nominal GDP should jump in equilibrium to 
cause the existing liabilities to equal the present discounted value from the surpluses). 
The order in which liabilities to GDP come first does not allow the contemprenous effect 
on the liabilities, which makes more sense in the Ricardian regime.  
7There is no consensus in the literature of fiscal theory of price level on the minimum number of lags to 
measure a high persistence of surplus. Canzoneri, et al. (2001) find positive autocorrelation at lag up to 9 years 
for US. For emerging market economies Zoli (2005) and Baldini and Ribeiro (2001) argue that the fiscal policy 
is more volatile than developed markets and they use 5 lags. The average length for developing countries to 
complete business cycle is three years [Rand and Tarp (2002)]. 
8Assessing how public liabilities respond to a shock in the surplus to GDP, conditional on surpluses 
being positively and persistently autocorrelated, in a monetary dominant regime, an increase (or positive shock 
in the current surplus leads to a fall in future liabilities to guarantee fiscal solvency. As a result, a monetary 
dominant regime is identified by a negative relationship between current surpluses and future liabilities. Under a 
fiscal dominant regime, however, the fiscal surpluses are assumed to be exogenous, and therefore future 
liabilities should be either unresponsive to a current increase in surpluses or lead to an increase. The other 
possibilities do not allow identifying any of these two regimes, therefore unidentified or ambiguous results.  
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The VAR is estimated with two lags and a constant and the Figure 1 represents 
the plots of impulse response function estimated for both ordering of variables. In the 
first ordering where Surplus to GDP comes first, the response of liabilities to an 
innovation in surplus to GDP is negative. In fact, the response of Liabilities to GDP 
is negative for 10 years, regardless of the ordering used. The univariate 
autocorrelations and the corresponding Q-statistics for surplus reported in Table 1 
indicate that there is significant positive autocorrelation for all first lags of surplus to 
GDP ratio. If the surpluses to GDP are positively correlated and liabilities to GDP in 
period t+1 onwards decreases, the results are in conformity with Ricardian or MD 
regime.  
Fig. 1.  VAR in Surplus/GDP and Liabilities/GDP 
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Table 1 
Autocorrelation of Primary Surplus/GDP 
Lag Autocorrelatio  Q-Stat  P-value 
1 0.73 21.75 0.00 
2 0.50 32.31 0.00 
3 0.37 38.16 0.00 
4 0.35 43.78 0.00 
5 0.41 51.67 0.00 
6 0.37 58.21 0.00 
7 0.35 64.34 0.00 
8 0.33 69.78 0.00 
9 0.28 73.85 0.00 
10 0.25 77.31 0.00 
11 0.15 78.52 0.00 
12 0.08 78.87 0.00 
13 0.02 78.89 0.00 
14 –0.01 78.89 0.00 
15 –0.02 78.91 0.00 
16 –0.07 79.27 0.00 
 
The result of impulse response functions from the VAR are given in Figure 2 
which shows that an innovation in surplus to GDP in period 0 tends to produce negative 
responses. The liabilities to GDP response is negative but not significant confirming that 
this response is followed by MD regime. The liabilities to GDP is one and more periods 
forward to an innovation in surplus to GDP is negative, that is in the subsequent period 
the debt decreases again with a surplus in each period that produces another surplus and 
so on. This characterises the MD or Ricardian regime.  
Fig. 2. VAR Model in Surplus/GDP and Liabilities/GDP 
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To confirm the result, following Canzoneri, et al. (2001) analysis has been done by 
assessing the behavior of GDP. According to Ricardian equivalence, changes in the 
government budget and public liabilities do not exert an effect on aggregate demand. In 
contrast, in non-Ricardian regime in the presence of nominal rigidity, it is believed that 
the aggregate demand variations resulting from fiscal shocks causes variation in the level 
of real economic activity and in real interest rate, as well as fluctuation in the inflation 
rate. To examine whether a positive innovation in the surplus to GDP reduces the 
nominal income in the same period and increases government liabilities, VAR is 
estimated with surplus to GDP, natural logarithm of liabilities and natural logarithm of 
GDP. As nominal GDP is expected to respond to the innovation in surplus in case of non-
Ricardian regime, the impulses response functions are analysed with ordering 
ln(liabilities), surplus to GDP, ln(GDP). The results of impulse response in Figure 3 
indicate that the innovation in the surplus to GDP reduces the nominal income but also 
decreases the level of liabilities in the subsequent period. This suggests that these 
findings confirm the existence of Ricardian regime. This analysis indicates that there is 
commitment in the authorities towards surplus generating polices in order to reduce 
liabilities.   
Fig. 3. VAR ln(liabilities), Surplus/GDP, Ln(GDP) 
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In the next stage, VAR is estimated involving surplus to GDP, liabilities to GDP 
and discount rate as proposed by Canzoneri, et al. (2001) to examine whether or not 
impulse responses survive after controlling for discount rate. Figure 4 shows impulse 
responses to an innovation in surplus to GDP. In the top panel the ordering goes from 
surplus to GDP, liabilities to GDP, discount rate in line with non-Ricardian regime. In the 
bottom panel the ordering is liabilities to GDP, surplus to GDP and discount rate 
consistent with Ricardian regime. The response of liabilities/GDP to surplus shock is 
negative for four periods following the shock. The response of discount rate is positive 
and insignificant. The response of surplus to GDP and liabilities to GDP is as persistent 
as obtained without including discount rate, that is basic results are robust to controlling 
for discount rate that is non-Ricardian regime is not working. These results are consisting 
with emerging market results for example by Fiallo and Partugal (2005) for Brazil, 
Baldini and Ribeiro (2008) for some Sub-Saharan African countries (Cameroon, Keynia, 
Nigeria, Rewanda and South Africa). 
Response to One S.D. Innovations + 2 S.E. 
Testing the Fiscal Theory of Price Level  773
Fig. 4. Surplus/GDP, Liabilities/GDP, Discount Rate 
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Note: The VAR model is estimated with two lags and a constant. 
The top panel ordering is Surplus/GDO  Liabilities/GDP Discount factor 
The bottom panel ordering is Liabilities/GDP  Surplus/GDP.  Discount factor.  
The wealth effect pass through analysis on price is done by decomposition of 
inflation variability reported in Table 2 and by impulse responses pictured in Figure 5 for 
ten periods. The analysis is undertaken that which of the two policy variables, reserve 
money growth or nominal debt growth better explains the inflation variability in case of 
Pakistan after controlling for aggregate demand channel captured by real output gap. The 
VAR is estimated following the ordering domestic debt growth, reserve money,  real 
output gap and inflation rate. The results suggest that in case of Pakistan, inflation 
variability is mostly explained by the debt growth (10.92 percent), than by the reserve 
money growth (1.16 percent). Canzoneri, et al. (2001) approach identifies MD regime in 
Pakistani case. The average percentage of inflation variability explained by debt growth 
is more than what is explained by reserve money growth suggesting that the type of MD 
regime seems to be explained by fiscal theory of price level. Baldini and Ribeiro (2008) 
come up with same findings in case of Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mauritius, Uganda and Zambia 
where the pass through analysis indicates the inflation variability is more closely 
associated with nominal debt, while analysing Sub-Saharan African countries. The results 
indicates that the forecast error is more explained by shocks in debt growth and suggest 
that changes in price level are explained by wealth effect of debt growth supporting the 
prediction of fiscal dominance. However, in case of Pakistan the increase in the domestic 
debt may be caused by several other factors, exogenous shocks and due to endogenous 
shocks for example political instability, 2005 earthquake or war on terror etc., causing 
imbalances in the supply and demand for goods increasing need for government deficit 
financing increasing domestic debt.  
Response to One S.D. Innovations + 2 S.E. 
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Table 2 
Variance Decomposition of INF 
Period S.E. TD RMG GAP INF 
1  3.622000  2.828269  6.410895  0.036414  90.72442 
2  4.557845  8.129574  5.995868  0.856532  85.01803 
3  4.773789  9.085645  5.929916  0.787413  84.19703 
4  4.848207  11.10081  6.402905  0.833709  81.66257 
5  4.905158  11.94281  6.857647  1.317685  79.88186 
6  4.966387  12.95595  7.125952  1.568167  78.34993 
7  5.017416  13.57980  7.360034  1.698986  77.36118 
8  5.056073  13.99127  7.446559  1.703622  76.85855 
9  5.076649  14.17347  7.443538  1.690049  76.69294 
10  5.085825  14.23960  7.417234  1.728435  76.61473 
 
Cholesky Ordering: TD RMG GAP INF.  
Fig. 5. Inflation Responses Due to Shock in Reserve Money Growth  
and Domestic Public Debt 
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Note:  The VAR for causal ordering Output Gap inflation Reserve money growth (or Discount Rate) with 
two and a constant.  
5.  CONCLUSION 
The present study provides quantitative evidence for application of fiscal theory of 
price level. For Pakistan, the evidence is less clear to infer that authorities are following a 
certain type of regime during the sample period 1970-2007. The liabilities respond 
negatively to the innovation in surpluses, that is in the subsequent period the liabilities 
decreases in the face of increase in surplus. This characterises MD regime, the events that 
Testing the Fiscal Theory of Price Level  775
give rise to surplus innovation are likely to persist causing the rise in the future surpluses 
and surpluses pay-off some of the debt causing the fall in the liabilities. By analysing the 
behavior of nominal GDP, an innovation in surplus reduces nominal income and 
decreases the level of debt in the subsequent periods; this analysis does not confirm the 
non-Ricardian analysis. On the other hand, the study finds that, as predicted by the fiscal 
theory of price determination, the occurrence of wealth effects of changes in nominal 
public debt may pass through to prices by increasing inflation variability in case of 
Pakistan. In addition, the results show that as predicted by fiscal theory of price 
determination the discount rate is decreasing in response to positive shock in inflation. 
The reverse also happens as the reserve money growth also responds negatively as 
predicted by the MD regime. Therefore, the implication that comes out of this study is 
that nominal public liabilities, as reflected either in money growth or in nominal public 
debt, matter for price stability in case of Pakistan. The authorities may be following 
different regimes for different time periods during the 1970-2007.  
There are certain limitations of the Canzoneri, et al. (2001) approach. For instance, it 
does not allow to identify a predominant regime if both FD and MD regimes are alternating 
during the sample period covered. This may result in having positively correlated surpluses 
but inconclusive impulse-response analysis. It would be appropriate to apply VAR techniques 
that allow to identify when regimes are switching [Leeper and Troy (2006)] for a theoretical 
model, and for an application to Brazil [Fialho and Portugal (2005)]. The use of different 
econometric tests and approaches to underpin the relative importance of monetary and fiscal 
determinants of inflation should improve the reliability of the results.  
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